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Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, Attempts, and
Implied Risk Preferences
Murat C. Mungan and Jonathan Klick
ABSTRACT
In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental
and econometric evidence—that criminals are more responsive to increases in the certainty
than the severity of punishment. Under a general set of assumptions, this implies that criminals
are risk seeking. We show that this implication is no longer valid when forfeiture of illegal
gains and the possibility of unsuccessful attempts are considered. Therefore, when drawing
inferences concerning offenders’ attitudes toward risk based on their responses to various
punishment schemes, special attention must be paid to whether and to what extent offenders’
illegal gains can be forfeited and whether increases in the probability of punishment affect
the probability of attempts being successful. We discuss policy implications related to our
observations.
1. INTRODUCTION
A presumption that dates back 250 years to Cesare Beccaria’s influential
work Dei delitti e delle pene is that “[c]rimes are more effectually pre-
vented by the certainty, than the severity of punishment” (Beccaria and
Voltaire 1953, p. 93).1 This presumption can be defined with more pre-
1. The original treatise was published by Cesare Beccaria in 1764.
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cision to avoid potential ambiguity: a 1 percent increase in the proba-
bility of punishment increases deterrence more than a 1 percent increase
in the severity of punishment.2 We refer to this presumption as the cer-
tainty aversion presumption (CAP).
The CAP is supported by some empirical evidence3 and is endorsed
by legal scholars as well as social scientists.4 A theoretical implication
of CAP seems at first glance to be that criminals are risk seeking.5 This
result is disturbing for many scholars, since it “would make criminals
different from the rest of the population, because the other types of
analysis have established that law abiding citizens tend to be risk averse”
(Neilson and Winter 1997, p. 97).
Some articles have identified ways to reconcile CAP and the intuitive
presumption that most people, even criminals, have a preference for
avoiding risk. Most of these articles, unlike ours, tend to rely on the
nonpecuniary nature of punishment.6 The article most relevant to our
analysis is Brown and Reynolds (1973).
Brown and Reynolds (1973, p. 509) define loss as “the decrement in
2. More precisely, let p and s respectively denote the probability and severity of pun-
ishment and D denote deterrence. The presumption is that .[(D)/(p)]p 1 [(D)/(s)]s
3. See, for example, Grogger (1991), Block and Gerety (1995), Paternoster (1987), but
see Friesen (2012), which criticizes Grogger (1991) and Block and Gerety (1995) and
reaches a conclusion that contradicts the certainty aversion presumption (CAP); see also
Section 4 for a brief discussion of existing empirical studies.
4. See, for example, Dressler (2010, p. 36): “In general however, an increase in the
detection, arrest and conviction rate is of greater deterrent consequence than an increase
in the severity of the penalty upon conviction” (citing Paternoster 1987). See also Becker
(1968, p. 178): “The widespread generalization that offenders are more deterred by the
probability of conviction than by punishment when convicted turns out to imply in the
expected utility approach that offenders are risk preferrers, at least in the relevant range
of punishment.”
5. See Becker (1968, n. 19), which proves that CAP implies a preference for risk in his
model.
6. Neilson and Winter (1997, p. 102), for instance, show that “if criminals’ preferences
are state-dependent or criminals are rank-dependent expected utility maximizers, it is pos-
sible for offenders to be both risk averse and more sensitive to changes in the certainty of
punishment.” Unlike in Neilson and Winter (1997), Block and Lind (1975) develop a model
in which criminals are expected-utility maximizers. In their model, criminals’ utility func-
tions have two arguments rather than a single argument: wealth and sentence. By relying
on this utility function they prove that criminals can be risk averse in wealth but risk
seeking in sentences and still obey CAP. The authors point out that criminals who discount
future sentences would appear to be risk seeking with respect to sentences, a point that is
also made in Polinsky and Shavell (1999), and thereby supply a rationale as to why risk
attitudes have different meanings in different contexts; they also note that criminals need
not be different from the rest of society simply because they are risk seeking with respect
to sentences.
F O R F E I T U R E O F I L L E G A L G A I N S / 139
income from [the offender’s] certain present income if convicted.” They
show that a percentage increase in the loss faced by the criminal can
lead to less deterrence than a percentage increase in the probability of
punishment, even if potential criminals are risk averse. If, as appears to
be implicitly assumed by Brown and Reynolds, criminals forgo all illegal
gains once caught, criminal losses and sanctions become equivalent, and
CAP and risk aversion can be reconciled. Our article, like Brown and
Reynolds (1973), does not rely on sanctions being nonmonetary but on
criminals more often forgoing illegal gains when the probability of pun-
ishment is increased.
We generalize and extend Brown and Reynolds (1973) by identifying
two separate but related explanations as to how risk aversion and CAP
can coexist. We show that if gains from illegal activity can be taken
away, or if they may simply not be realized when an offender is unsuc-
cessful in his criminal attempt, then the criminal may act in a manner
consistent with CAP yet be risk averse. We use the expression “forfeiture
of illegal gains”7 to refer to the former situation and term the latter
situation “attempts.”
Incidentally, we reveal the similarities and distinctions between the
law and economics of attempts and forfeiture of illegal gains. We thereby
add to the economic understanding of attempts, which appears to be
understudied and mostly abandoned.8 To see how attempts and forfeiture
of illegal gains are interrelated, note that in the standard law enforcement
model, as pioneered by Becker (1968) and described in Polinsky and
Shavell (2007), apprehension occurs after the offender obtains criminal
gains. These gains are assumed to be kept, or enjoyed, by the criminal
even if he is detected and punished. There are at least two ways in which
this assumption can be violated. First, the offender can be apprehended
before he successfully completes his crime, in which case we refer to the
7. There is a related and expanding literature analyzing the effects of forfeiture of illegal
gains on optimal law enforcement policies. See, for example, Bowles, Faure, and Garoupa
(2000, 2005). This literature focuses mainly on the normative implications of forfeiture of
illegal gains by taking offenders’ risk attitudes as given. (But see Friehe [2011], which takes
offenders’ risk preferences as given—by assuming that they are risk neutral—and makes
the positive assertion that forfeiture of illegal gains can reduce deterrence if avoidance
activities are possible.) Our article contributes to the complementary and positive side of
this literature by pointing out a potential inferential fallacy if forfeiture of illegal gains are
not considered when evaluating offenders’ risk preferences.
8. Posner (1985), Shavell (1990), Friedman (1991), and Ben-Shahar and Harel (1996)
stand out as the most comprehensive articles studying the law and economics of attempts.
We were unable to locate more recent articles studying attempts, aside from those that
briefly revisit the subject, for example, Mungan (2011).
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case as an attempt. Second, criminal gains can be forfeited even if ap-
prehension occurs after the crime is successfully committed.
Although these two cases may seem equivalent, or the differences
between them may seem nonconsequential, there are subtle but impor-
tant differences between them, at least for purposes of studying the
implications of CAP. In particular, (i) a degree of forfeiture upon pun-
ishment is sufficient to reconcile CAP and risk aversion, but (ii) the
prospect of being punished for an uncompleted crime is insufficient for
CAP and risk aversion to coexist. More is needed, namely, a correlation
between the probabilities of crime prevention and punishment.
To see how this distinction arises, first note that when forfeiture is
possible, an increase in the probability of punishment leads to an increase
in expected losses but also a reduction in expected benefits through the
taking away of criminal gains. In contrast, when unsuccessful attempts
are possible, an increase in the probability of punishment does not nec-
essarily affect the likelihood that the potential offender will be punished
in the act rather than on successful commission of the crime. Therefore,
absent an expectation of forfeiture of illegal gains, an increase in the
probability of punishment may affect only expected punishment and not
expected benefits, which depend only on the probability of successful
commission of crimes. For these reasons, unless there is a correlation
between the probabilities of crime prevention and punishment—which
we argue is likely to exist—the prospect of being punished for an attempt
does not reconcile CAP and risk aversion.
It is also worth briefly mentioning that although our explanations do
not rely on the nonpecuniary nature of punishment, considerations re-
lated to imprisonment are likely to increase the empirical relevance of
our forfeiture model. Even if no physical forfeiture takes place, a person
who is imprisoned must, in many circumstances, delay the enjoyment
of his criminal gains while in prison. As long as the criminal discounts
the future use of these gains, he will derive a lower utility from his
criminal proceeds. Therefore, a forfeiture effect is present even in cases
in which physical forfeiture is not.
The theoretical contributions of our article, to sum up, include not
only demonstrating how and under what conditions the incorporation
of forfeiture of illegal gains and/or unsuccessful criminal attempts rec-
onciles CAP and risk aversion but also highlighting the interrelations
and distinctions between the law and economics of forfeiture of illegal
gains and attempts. Future empirical studies on criminals’ risk attitudes
are likely to benefit from these clarifications and contributions, because
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studies that do not account for potential and systematic differences in
the degree of expected forfeiture of illegal gains or correlations between
probabilities of crime prevention and punishment across different offense
categories may produce misguided policy prescriptions.
The remaining sections of this article are structured as follows. In
Section 2 we construct a crime and deterrence model that incorporates
forfeiture of illegal gains and thereby reconciles CAP and risk aversion.
Section 3 contains a similar model incorporating criminal attempts and
shows that CAP and risk aversion can coexist if there is correlation
between the probability of an unsuccessful attempt and the probability
of detection. Section 4 contains a discussion of existing empirical and
experimental work analyzing criminals’ responsiveness to increases in
the severity versus certainty of punishment and makes observations
about how future empirical studies can be designed to account for our
theoretical observations and thereby provide more accurate inferences
regarding criminals’ risk preferences. Policy implications are discussed
in Section 5, and Section 6 contains a brief discussion of results and
concluding remarks.
2. FORFEITURE OF ILLEGAL GAINS AND IMPLIED RISK PREFERENCES
When forfeiture of illegal gains is a significant concern for the criminal,
increasing the probability of detection leads to an increase in the ex-
pected monetary fine as well as a reduction in expected benefits. In
contrast, an increase in the sanction increases only the expected mon-
etary fine but does not affect the expected benefits of crime. Therefore,
it is only natural that potential offenders contemplating such crimes are
more sensitive to increases in the probability of detection rather than
an increase in monetary fines, even if they are risk-averse expected-utility
maximizers.
To formalize this intuitive idea, it is sufficient to relax the assumption
that offenders reap the entire benefit of their criminal activity regardless
of whether they are caught. In the standard Beckerian framework, an
individual obtains a payoff of b immediately after committing a crime,
and this is not contingent on evading detection; hence, the expected
benefit from crime is
b  ps, (1)
where b is the benefit from crime, p is the probability of detection, and
s is the monetary sanction. If, however, b is partially or entirely taken
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away from the criminal after he is caught, then the expected benefit from
crime is
(1  p)b  p(1  a)b  ps, (2)
or with slightly less notation
b  pab  ps, (3)
where is the proportion of the benefit that the criminal is unable1 ≥ a ≥ 0
to reap if caught.
Expected benefits are equivalent to expected utility (U) for risk-neutral
criminals. It is a straightforward task to show that a risk-neutral individual
is more responsive to an increase in the probability of detection when
forfeiture of illegal gains is considered (that is, ):a 1 0
U p p U s
 p (ab  s) 1 ( )p U b  pab  ps s U (4)
s
p p( )b  pab  ps
if a 1 0.
Since a risk-neutral individual is more responsive to the probability
of detection, it should be intuitively clear that some risk-averse individ-
uals are also more responsive to increases in the probability of detection.
This can be formalized by considering conditions under which any ex-
pected-utility maximizer exhibits behavior consistent with CAP. To do
this, consider the incentives an expected-utility-maximizing offender
faces. He commits a crime if9
(1  p)V(b)  pV[(1  a)b  s] ≥ V(0), (5)
where V is the criminal’s von Neumann–Morgenstern utility with ′V 1
. It follows from expression (5) that there is some b with a value greater0
than 0, denoted b*, that makes a criminal indifferent between commit-
ting a crime and remaining innocent. Hence,
(1  p)V(b*)  pV[(1  a)b*  s]  V(0) p 0. (6)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have that
b* p b* s≥ (7)
p b* s b*
if and only if . This condition′V(b*)  V[(1  a)b*  s] ≥ sV [(1  a)b*  s]
can be rewritten as
9. The criminal’s initial wealth position is normalized to zero.
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b (1a)b b* * *
′ ′ ′V (y)dy p V (y)dy  V (y)dy  
(1a)b s (1a)b s (1a)b* * * (8)
(1a)b*
′≥ V [(1  a)b*  s]dy
(1a)b s*
or
b (1a)b* *
′ ′ ′V (y)dy ≥ {V [(1  a)b*  s]  V (y)}dy. (9) 
(1a)b (1a)b s* *
Expression (9) establishes that if CAP is a valid presumption, then V
cannot be concave unless —since implies that the second′ ′a 1 0 V ! 0
term in expression (9) is always positive. Hence, is a necessarya 1 0
condition to have risk aversion and CAP simultaneously. That risk aver-
sion and CAP can simultaneously exist follows immediately from the
fact that expression (9) holds when V is linear and , which impliesa 1 0
that one can construct a slightly concave function for which expression
(9) continues to hold.10
The best way to interpret these results is by focusing on the simple
expression (3), which represents the expected benefit from crime. As
stated earlier, when forfeiture of illegal gains is a valid consideration,
increasing p has two effects: it increases the expected sanction (ps) and
reduces the expected benefit from crime ( ). An increase in the(1  pa)b
penalty, however, increases only the expected sanction (ps). This is what
drives the result that we derive in this section, namely, that CAP and
risk aversion can coexist when partial or complete forfeiture of illegal
gains is expected.
Before concluding the analysis of forfeiture of illegal gains and pro-
ceeding with the analysis of attempts, it is worth highlighting how the
10. Formally, consider utility functions of the form . The difference between thezV p y
left- and right-hand sides of expression (9) can be rewritten as a function of z:
b (1a)b**
z1 z1 z1H(z) p z y dy  {[(1  a)b*  s]  y }dy . ( )
(1a)b* (1a)b*s
Hence, . Since H is continuous in z around , there exists suchH(1) p ab* 1 0 z p 1  1 0
that .H(1  ) 1 0
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preceding analysis relates to Brown and Reynolds (1973). Brown and
Reynolds appear to implicitly assume that criminals obtain a payoff of
s (in our notation) when they are caught. If the authors were making
this assumption to incorporate the effects of forfeiture of illegal gains,
then their model becomes a special case of the simple model presented
above, in which . Since the main result (namely, CAP does nota p 1
imply risk-seeking preferences) holds for all , their assumption thata 1 0
forfeiture is complete, rather than partial, is harmless for purposes of
demonstrating this result.
But the authors might have had other motivations in mind while
making the implicit assumption that illegal gains are not realized when
the criminal is caught. The motivating example in Brown and Reynolds
(1973, p. 508) seems to suggest that the authors made this assumption
because they had unsuccessful attempts in mind: “R. Hood tries to rob
an armored car containing $1,000,000. He is caught in the act, tried
and convicted.” In Section 3, we study unsuccessful attempts and show
that the incorporation of unsuccessful attempts, without more, is in-
sufficient to reconcile CAP and risk aversion.
3. ATTEMPTS AND IMPLIED RISK PREFERENCES
Following Shavell (1990), we assume that a criminal is successful in
committing the crime only with a probability of . Successful crimesq ! 1
lead to illegal gains, which, if the criminal is caught later, may (in the
case of ) or may not (in the case of ) be forfeited. Attempts,a 1 0 a p 0
however, confer no benefits to criminals.11 The probability of catching
a criminal successfully committing or attempting to commit a crime is
p.12 To allow for different sanctions for attempts and completed crimes,
we assume that the sanction for attempts (ks) is a fraction of the sanction
for completed crimes (s), where . To incorporate potential corre-k ≤ 1
lations between probabilities of detection and the probability that a
criminal successfully completes a crime, we express q as q(p).
Given this notation, the aggregate probability with which an indi-
vidual is punished is given by , where the firstp p [q(p)p]  [(1  q(p))p]
and second bracketed terms, respectively, describe the probability of
11. This assumption is invoked in Friedman (1991) and Mungan (2011) and appears
to be more realistic than the alternative and simplifying one in Shavell (1990), which assigns
benefits to criminals even for attempts.
12. We are assuming that these probabilities are equal to save on notation and to simplify
the analysis. Our conclusion does not depend on this particular assumption.
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punishment for a completed crime and an attempt. Thus, a potential
risk-neutral offender’s expected utility from committing a crime can be
described as
U p q(p)(b  pab  ps)  [1  q(p)]pks. (10)
Therefore, a risk-neutral individual commits a crime if , orU ≥ 0
ps k
b ≥ 1  k  { b*. (11)[ ]1  pa q(p)
These individuals are more responsive to increases in the probability
rather than the severity of the sanction if
U p p′ ′ p {q [p(ab  s)  b]  q(s  ab)  (1  q)ks  q pks}
p U U (12)
U s s
1  p [qp  (1  q)pk] ,
s U U
where q(p) and q′(p) are respectively denoted q and q′ to save on notation.
Equation (12) can be simplified by subtracting the right-hand side of the
inequality from the left-hand side and dividing by p so that the condition
becomes
′ ( )q p ab  s  pks  b  qab 1 0. (13)( )
Expression (13) immediately reveals that if illegal gains cannot be
forfeited (that is, ), and if there is no correlation between thea p 0
probabilities of punishment and criminal success (that is, for′q (p) p 0
all p), risk-neutral criminals are equally responsive to the certainty and
severity of sanctions. This implies that CAP and risk aversion cannot
coexist.13
However, there are persuasive reasons to believe that such correla-
tions in fact exist.14 First, because similar expenditures are used to in-
13. This result has a simple implication concerning Brown and Reynolds (1973). If the
authors had criminal attempts in mind (see the last paragraph in Section 2) when they
were implicitly assuming that criminals obtain a payoff of s when caught, then their
conclusion that CAP does not imply risk aversion is incomplete. As demonstrated by ex-
pression (13), this conclusion requires some correlation between the probabilities of crim-
inal success and punishment. It should also be noted that if interpreted as analyzing at-
tempts, Brown and Reynolds (1973) must have made the unrealistic assumption that
when the offender is (un)successful in committing a crime and assumed that(p p 1) p p 0
the government directly controls q. That this assumption is unrealistic is revealed simply
by noting that there are many criminals who are caught after successfully committing
crimes, which implies that for successful crimes.p ( 0
14. Ben-Shahar and Harel (1996) identify the analogues of these reasons in the context
of precautionary behavior by potential victims.
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crease the probability of punishment and the probability of crime pre-
vention, it is plausible to assume that there is some positive correlation
between them.15 Such expenditures can simply lead criminals to be
caught more often in the act and prevent them from successfully carrying
out their plans.16 Second, when the government spends more on law
enforcement, criminals are expected to spend more time and effort in
preparation for crime, which increases the likelihood that they will be
caught.17 Therefore, we believe it is plausible to assume that .′q (p) ! 0
Revisiting expression (13) under this assumption reveals that risk-
neutral individuals are more responsive to increases in the probability
than the severity of punishment. This can be confirmed by substituting
b with the expression for b*, as defined in expression (11). This obser-
vation, coupled with the fact that , implies that expression (13) always′q ! 0
holds and that this is true even when and for all .a p 0 k  [0, 1]
Thus any positive correlation between the probability of punishment
and the likelihood of catching criminals before they complete their crimes
is sufficient to explain why risk-neutral individuals are deterred more
by an increase in the certainty than in the severity of punishment. Fur-
thermore, this result does not depend on whether illegal gains are for-
feitable or on the severity of the punishment for attempts.
It is relatively straightforward to exploit this result, as in Section 2,
to demonstrate that one can reconcile CAP and risk aversion. Because
the difference between risk-neutral criminals (namely, individuals whose
utility functions are of the form ) in their responsiveness to1V(x) p x
increases in the certainty and severity of punishment is positive, one can
find risk-averse individuals (individuals whose utility functions are of
15. Shavell (1991) makes a similar point concerning correlations between probabilities
of detecting various crimes.
16. Ben-Shahar and Harel (1996, p. 336) make the analogous point in considering the
effects of potential victims’ precautions on the likelihood of criminal success: “Precautions
against crime taken by potential victims reduce the chances of successful completion of the
crime either by increasing the chances that the perpetrator will not complete the activities
he plans to commit, or by increasing the chances that, even if the perpetrator completes
his plan, the desired consequences of the plan will not be realized.”
17. This point is also identified by Ben-Shahar and Harel (1996, p. 336): “Precautions
taken by potential victims of crime force potential criminals to go through a longer sequence
of pre-crime activities. The longer sequence of pre-crime activities exposes the perpetrator
to a greater risk of being interrupted before the completion of the crime. Hence, a crime
directed against a more cautious victim is more likely to wind up being classified as an
attempt than a crime directed against a less cautious victim.”
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the form ) for whom this difference is smaller but still pos-1V(x) p x
itive.18
4. THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY
As suggested above, it has largely been taken for granted that certainty
of punishment has a larger proportionate effect on deterrence than does
severity of punishment. As noted in surveys by Paternoster (1987, 2010),
Beccaria wrote, “The certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate,
will always make a stronger impression than the fear of another which
is more terrible but combined with the hope of impunity” (Beccaria
1963, p. 58). Paternoster goes on to note that the general consensus
remained unmodified through the 1970s and 1980s, citing the agreement
of the well-known text Zimring and Hawkins (1973). Paternoster (1987,
p. 188) also notes that empirical examination by criminologists using
observational and experimental data consistently finds a deterrent effect
for increases in certainty of punishment but fails to find similarly robust
effects for increases in severity, which leads him to conclude that “within
a few years, those working in the area came to understand that if the
deterrence process works, it does so solely through perceived certainty.”
The conventional wisdom continues on into more recent times. In
describing the literature on certainty and severity, Nagin and Pogarsky
(2001, p. 865) state that a prominent finding in this literature is “that
punishment certainty is far more consistently found to deter than is
punishment severity.” More recently, Durlauf and Nagin (2012, p. 43)
evaluate the modern empirical literature as indicating “there is little
evidence that increases in the severity of punishment yield strong mar-
ginal deterrent effects,” while “[b]y contrast there is very substantial
evidence that increases in the certainty of punishment produce substan-
tial deterrent effects.”
In their influential book, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) deduce from
this conventional wisdom and the available empirical evidence that crim-
inals appear to be risk loving. To the extent that conclusions like this
are based on systematic empirical findings, those findings are perhaps
too blunt to make such strong conclusions about the decision making
of criminals. The general conclusion of criminologists that the absence
of evidence for severity effects implies that certainty effects are larger is
18. See note 10 for a proof of the corresponding case in the context of forfeiture of
illegal gains when q is fixed at 1. The complete proof for the case of attempts is very similar
but lengthier because it involves more notation and has therefore been omitted.
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too quick. For various reasons, the research designs examining severity
may lack power or may be more susceptible to bias, given that there
are fewer large shocks to punishments than there are to the policy inputs
for the certainty of punishment (for example, changes to police staffing).
However, the existing experimental evidence, by and large, provides
evidence in favor of CAP among criminals (see Block and Gerety 1995;
Faragó, Kiss, and Boros 2008; Pachur, Hanoch, and Gummerum 2010).
Lee and McCrary (2009) also provide some econometric evidence con-
sistent with CAP.19
Existing empirical evidence does not allow us to distinguish our model
from one assuming that criminals have risk preferences that are system-
atically different than those of noncriminals. However, going forward,
empirical researchers could focus on ways to distinguish the two models.
The most promising avenue in this regard is to examine heterogeneity
of estimated police elasticities across types of crimes, with forfeiture or
failed attempts being more relevant for some kinds of crimes than others,
and across jurisdictions. Regarding heterogeneity of effects by crime
type, there may be differentials based on how quickly the fruits of a
crime can be enjoyed. For example, in our model (but not the risk-loving
criminal model), an increase in police staffing would likely have a larger
effect on the theft of property a criminal intends to fence than it would
on the theft of cash. Because it takes time to sell the stolen goods, the
likelihood of forfeiture increases, all other things equal.
On the point regarding heterogeneity of effects by jurisdiction, re-
searchers could distinguish between police shocks that lead to more
police on the beat (which increases the number of foiled attempts and
makes it more likely that apprehension will occur before the gains from
a crime can be consumed) versus shocks to resources available for in-
vestigation (which increase the likelihood of punishment but do not add
as much to the imminence of discovery and apprehension). Similarly,
researchers may begin to compare the elasticities resulting from shocks
to apprehension probability coming from increased number of police
versus procedural changes that affect the probability of conviction.
This model may also help us understand differences in deterrence
elasticity differentials between violent crime categories (in which for-
feiture is largely irrelevant) and property crime categories (in which
19. Lee and McCrary (2009) find that the magnitude of the elasticity of crime with
respect to the likelihood of apprehension exceeds the elasticity with respect to expected
sentence lengths, sometimes by a factor of 10.
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forfeiture is a real consideration). Care must be taken, though, in these
comparisons since both violent and property crimes involve the potential
for foiled attempts. As empirical crime deterrence research becomes more
mature, examining the sources of heterogeneity of effects20 will assume
a more central role in the econometric research. More precise theoretical
modeling will also become more important as empirical research moves
in the structural direction.
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND REMARKS
Recent policy work, such as Kleiman (2010), argues strongly in favor
of rebalancing law enforcement resources and strategy away from tools
affecting severity (for example, long prison sentences) to those affecting
probability (for example, police). Much of this work is based on the
empirical evidence showing that police generate deterrence while in-
creasingly severe sentences do not generate similar results as reliably.
These policy recommendations often cite the conventional wisdom re-
garding certainty aversion among criminals.
Our model suggests that perhaps these recommendations should be
qualified more and the empirical evidence revisited. The degree to which
probability-enhancing tools should be favored over severity-enhancing
tools may depend on the type of crime considered, especially the degree
to which forfeiture is relevant and whether attempts can be foiled. Along
those lines, in the allocation of resources affecting the probability of
apprehension and sanction between preventive or investigatory, our
model provides some insight regarding policy trade-offs.
For example, if the forfeiture rate is low, preventive law enforcement
is more cost-effective. When coupled with preventive law enforcement,
small sanctions for incomplete attempts could be effective, because the
person is already deprived of the benefit from crime. Similarly, when the
forfeiture rate after a crime is high, small sanctions may be sufficient,
since a portion of the penalty has already been imposed through for-
feiture. Accordingly, given that sanctions are costly, ceteris paribus, it
may be optimal to reserve large sanctions for crimes for which the for-
feiture rate is low and the criminal overcomes preventive measures and
successfully completes his crime. If this reasoning is correct, this also
gives us a way to look at the optimal difference between the punishments
for completed versus noncompleted offenses. The difference should be
20. In addition to the heterogeneity across crime types discussed above, there is likely
heterogeneity across jurisdictions.
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greater, everything else equal, for crimes for which forfeiture rates are
low.
In addition, though our model is not normative, its implications may
be important for those engaging in social welfare analyses. If such anal-
yses include the benefits of criminals in the social calculus, then attitudes
toward risk are important, because we want to figure out whether policy
should be geared toward reducing risk-bearing costs for risk-averse peo-
ple (or risk-bearing benefits for risk-seeking individuals). If, however,
criminal benefits are ignored, for purposes of achieving deterrence, it is
important to know only how criminals respond to various punishment
schemes and which punishment scheme can be achieved at the lowest
cost. It is thus unnecessary to identify criminals’ risk preferences. But
even then, our article cautions against drawing broad conclusions re-
garding criminals’ risk preferences based on limited empirical evidence,
which could lead to policy recommendations hinging on the potentially
mistaken belief that criminals are risk seeking.
6. CONCLUSION
We demonstrate that forfeiture of illegal gains and/or the possibility of
preventing crime before it is completed are sufficient to reconcile risk
aversion with the presumption that criminals are more responsive to
increases in the probability of detection than increases in the punishment.
This is an important result drawing into question the idea that criminals
have different risk attitudes than the rest of society. This conclusion
regarding differential risk preferences has been too readily embraced by
criminal law scholars. It also has important implications for empirical
methods used to identify criminals’ risk preferences. In particular, it
suggests that empirical studies that do not account for potential and
systematic differences in a or correlations between probabilities of crime
prevention and punishment across different offense categories may pro-
duce biased results.
Whether forfeiture of illegal gains is an important consideration for
potential criminals is a question that can potentially be answered through
empirical analyses. Violent crimes such as rape, murder, and battery
typically involve instant criminal benefits. Theft-type crimes,21 in con-
trast, typically require the spending or consumption of the wrongfully
acquired gains. As a result, the forfeiture rate (that is, a) is expected to
21. Examples are larceny, robbery, shoplifting, looting, fraud, and embezzlement.
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be higher for crimes involving theft than for crimes such as murder, rape,
and battery. If so, ceteris paribus, the difference between criminals’ re-
sponsiveness to certainty and responsiveness to severity should be greater
for crimes involving theft than for violent crimes.22 Therefore, our ob-
servation can be used to form a testable hypothesis that can guide future
research to identify the importance of forfeiture of illegal gains.
Before concluding, it is worth making a brief remark about the way
in which our result could be interpreted. If one measures severity by
aggregating forfeited gains and the exogenously imposed sanction and
formulates CAP by referring to this meaning of severity, then the presence
of CAP would imply risk-seeking behavior. We do not believe that schol-
ars studying law enforcement ordinarily use the word “severity” in this
sense.23 This distinction is important and not merely a semantic point.
As stated, if empirical studies fail to account for forfeitable gains in
measuring changes in severity, then one cannot rely on them to draw
valid inferences concerning offenders’ risk preferences.
Finally, it should be noted that the assumption of monetary fines is
used to make the argument as general as possible. As demonstrated in
the literature, when sanctions are nonmonetary, there may be other con-
siderations that may reconcile CAP and risk aversion. To isolate the
problem from such considerations, we assume monetary sanctions and
that stigma and other costs from incarceration are not present. But the
explanation that we provide should not be affected by the nature of the
sanction. Assuming that criminals reap the entire benefit of crime simply
underestimates the deterrent value of p and overestimates the preferences
for risk implied by CAP.
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